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COMMENT 
CRIMINALS BY NECESSITY: THE AMERICAN 
HOMELESS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Lisa M. Kline† 
 Remember when homelessness itself was not a crime, until 
the homeless made themselves too visible by panhandling at 
ATMs? Only when they made affluent people uncomfortable 
were they locked up . . . . The criminalization of homelessness—
one of the ways this society gets rid of the poor as well as a 
certain number of people with psychiatric disabilities—removes 
the daily reminders of the obvious injustice of the very existence 
of homelessness in the richest country in the world.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the economic condition of the nation worsens, the plight of the 
American homeless population continues to deteriorate. Since the 
beginning of the current recession, families across the nation have been 
forced into poverty. Between April of 2008 and April of 2009, there was a 
32% increase in foreclosures nationwide.2 Over six million jobs have been 
lost since the economic downturn, and that number continues to grow every 
day.3 In fact, the national unemployment rate peaked in October of 2009; at 
over 10%—its highest point since 1983.4 Often, the cost of living prevents 
these people from getting back on their feet. In every state, more than 
minimum wage is required to afford a one- or two-bedroom apartment at 
Fair Market Rent,5 making it virtually impossible for an entire fragment of 
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 1. TERRY KUPERS, PRISON MADNESS: THE MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS BEHIND BARS AND 
WHAT WE MUST DO ABOUT IT 259 (1999).  
 2. Why Are People Homeless?, NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, 
http://www.nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/Why.pdf (July, 2009). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Peter S. Goodman, U.S. Unemployment Rate Hits 10.2%, Highest in 26 Years, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/07/business/ 
economy/07jobs.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2010). 
 5. Fair Market Rent is the “amount needed to rent privately owned, decent, safe, and 
sanitary rental housing of a modest (non-luxury) nature with suitable amenities.” Final Fair 
Market Rents for Fiscal Year 2010 for the Housing Choice Voucher Program and Moderate 
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society to obtain permanent housing.6 Without any other options, many of 
these families have had to move to the streets and shelters. 
It is estimated that over 12% of the nation’s population lives in poverty.7 
These individuals, if not already homeless, are teetering on the edge of 
homelessness.8 One car accident, one job loss, or one health issue would 
send any one of these people to the street in a matter of days.  
As the problem of homelessness grows, so do laws criminalizing 
homeless activities. In a 2009 report, the National Law Center on 
Homelessness and Poverty surveyed 235 cities across the nation and 
compiled information about city ordinances criminalizing homelessness.9 
Of those 235 cities, 33% prohibit “camping” in particular public places, 
30% prohibit sleeping or lying in public places, 47% prohibit loitering in 
public areas, and 47% prohibit begging in particular public places.10 These 
laws are sometimes enforced selectively and are usually enforced without 
mercy. 
When confronted with the issue of homelessness, many people respond 
with either apathy or disgust. The first images that spring to mind are those 
of drunken, lazy people who choose not to work. However, many times, 
that is simply not the case. Many people thrust into poverty today have no 
other option, yet they are viewed as failures too lazy to contribute to 
society. Throughout our nation’s short history, the homeless and working 
poor have consistently been viewed with a certain level of disdain.11 Many 
even contend that we should not care about the homeless, or that the 
treatment they are receiving is what they deserve. Why should we care 
about the homeless? The United States is a nation based on the principle of 
equality. The Declaration of Independence states:  
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
                                                                                                                           
Rehabilitation Single Room Occupancy Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 50,552. (Sept. 30, 2009). 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) establishes FMRs in every locality in each of the 
fifty states. 
 6. NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 2, at 2. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Homes Not Handcuffs: The Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities, NAT’L 
COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, http://www.nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/criminalization.pdf 
(July, 2009), (offering a more detailed analysis of the above summary 
http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/crimreport/CrimzReport_2009.pdf). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
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unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments 
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed . . . .12  
The Founders believed that every individual is born with certain 
unalienable rights. These rights—often called fundamental rights—are 
those rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” or “deeply rooted in 
[the nation’s] history and tradition.”13 The Founders believed that these 
unalienable rights come from God, our Creator, through Natural Law.14 
Throughout the Bible, there are over 2,000 verses that address the issues of 
poverty and social justice.15 Many of those scriptures, like Micah 6:8, 
include admonitions such as: “[W]hat does the LORD require of you but to 
do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God?”16 
Other verses illustrate God’s heart for the poor: “[L]earn to do good; seek 
justice, correct oppression; bring justice to the fatherless, plead the widow’s 
cause.”17  
This Comment argues that certain cities violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution by the particular ways the 
cities criminalize homelessness. Therefore, courts should invalidate these 
laws, and legislatures should implement more constructive ways of dealing 
with the problem of homelessness. This Comment will not argue that the 
government has any obligation to provide housing to the homeless or that 
the homeless class deserves special benefit rights.18 Instead, this Comment 
argues that the government has a duty not to infringe on any individual’s 
basic freedom rights as outlined in the Fourteenth Amendment, whether 
that individual is homeless or not. Part II presents the history and 
development of homelessness in our nation and examines how the homeless 
have come to be viewed as a criminal class. Part II also surveys the judicial 
response to the criminalization of homelessness. Part III lays out the 
                                                                                                                           
 12. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 13. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003). 
 14. W. CLEON SKOUSEN, THE 5,000 YEAR LEAP: THE 28 GREAT IDEAS THAT CHANGED 
THE WORLD 46 (2007). 
 15. The Bible That Reveals God’s Passion, THE POVERTY AND JUSTICE BIBLE, 
http://www.povertyandjusticebible.org.au/index.php (last visited May 1, 2010). 
 16. Micah 6:8 (English Standard Version). 
 17. Isaiah 1:17 (English Standard Version). 
 18. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (holding that the government may not 
preclude an individual from exercising his fundamental rights, but government “need not 
remove those not of its own creation”). 
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problems brought on by the criminalization of homelessness through an in-
depth analysis of the ways these statutes violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
in two cities: Seattle, Washington and St. Petersburg, Florida. Part IV then 
presents an analytical framework based on the Fourteenth and Fourth 
Amendments, examining the issue through the Due Process Clause, the 
Equal Protection Clause, and the implied right to travel. Part V concludes 
the Comment with an overview of the work being done throughout the 
nation to repeal these laws and decriminalize homelessness. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Development of the Criminalization of Homelessness 
Vagrancy laws date back to feudal England, when the Statutes of 
Laborers were enacted in response to the depopulation caused by the Black 
Death.19 The Statutes of Labourers required every able-bodied person to 
work for wages fixed at a certain level.20 These statutes essentially sought 
to turn every working class citizen into a serf.21 Under these laws, it was 
illegal to accept more than the set wage, to refuse an offer of work, or to 
give money to beggars who refused to work.22 In an effort to enforce these 
laws, the Act of 1414 gave justices of the peace the power to punish 
vagrants.23 Despite the measures taken to criminalize vagrancy, the 
homeless population continued to grow.24 Poor work conditions and a lack 
of work created an entire class of individuals who became a burden to 
society.25 Therefore, laws were enacted that confined those unable to work 
to their own town; if they left, they would be forcibly removed, returning 
them to the town legally bound to support them.26 
In sixteenth-century England, the Slavery Acts mandated two years 
imprisonment for any individual who “live[d] idly and loiteringly, by the 
                                                                                                                           
 19. Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of 
Official Efforts To Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REV. 631, 635 
(1992).  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. 
 22. 23 Edw. 3, c. 7 (1349). 
 23. 2 Hen. 5, c. 4 (1414). 
 24. Simon, supra note 19, at 636. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 
616 (1956). 
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space of three days . . . .”27 By the nineteenth century, “the roads of 
England were crowded with masterless men and their families, who had lost 
their former employment through a variety of causes, had no means of 
livelihood, and had taken to vagrant life.”28 The decay of the feudal system 
and the deteriorating economy exacerbated the problem.29 The dissolution 
of the monasteries under King Henry VIII drastically affected the poor, 
taking away the religious institutions that had provided assistance.30  
These policies and prejudices carried over to early American law and 
helped shape the laws regarding the homeless.31 Paupers and vagabonds 
were specifically excepted from the privileges and immunities clause of the 
Articles of Confederation: “The free inhabitants of each of these States, 
paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to 
all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the 
people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any 
other State . . . .”32 This constitutes one of the earliest examples in America 
of the homeless being explicitly denied the right to travel—a right that the 
Supreme Court has since recognized as fundamental.33  
In Mayor of New York v. Miln, the United States Supreme Court held 
that New York could deny paupers arriving by ship entrance into the 
country:  
We think it as competent and as necessary for a state to provide 
precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, 
vagabonds, and possibly convicts; as it is to guard against the 
physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound and 
infections articles imported, or from a ship, the crew of which 
may be laboring under an infectious disease.34  
Forty years later, the Supreme Court described government efforts to 
exclude paupers as “a right founded . . . in the sacred law of self-defence.”35 
Society began to question laws prohibiting homelessness during the Great 
                                                                                                                           
 27. Mark Malone, Note, Homelessness in a Modern Urban Setting, 10 FORD. URB. L.J. 
749, 754 n.17 (1982). 
 28. Ledwith v. Roberts, 1 K.B. 232, 271 (1937). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161 (1972). 
 32. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV (emphasis added). 
 33. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). 
 34. Mayor v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 142-43 (1837). 
 35. R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877). 
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Depression.36 However, no real changes appeared until after World War II, 
when federal and state courts across the nation began to strike down 
vagrancy laws as void for vagueness.37 Cities responded to these court 
decisions by enacting more specific ordinances.38 Courts consistently 
upheld these newer ordinances until the early 1990s, at which point some 
courts began holding them unconstitutional.39 Today, many of these types 
of ordinances are still enforced.40 While these ordinances may not be as 
blatantly anti-homeless, the effects are the same—they make basic life 
activities necessary for existence on the street illegal.41  
B. The Judicial Response to the Criminalization of Homelessness 
Pottinger v. City of Miami was the first notable instance that a court 
applied the Fourth Amendment to a statute criminalizing homelessness.42 In 
Pottinger, a group of homeless individuals challenged the seizure of their 
personal belongings and alleged that the City had a policy of harassing 
homeless people for sleeping, eating, and performing life-sustaining 
activities in public places.43 The district court found that the criminalization 
of essential acts performed in public when there was no alternative violated 
the plaintiffs’ right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment.44 In addition, the court found that the City violated the 
plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth Amendment.45 The court also found that 
approximately 6000 people were homeless in Miami, while there were 
fewer than 700 shelter spaces.46 On review, the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals referred the case for mediation.47 The parties negotiated a 
settlement requiring the City to institute a law enforcement protocol to 
                                                                                                                           
 36. Simon, supra note 19, at 640. 
 37. Id. at 642. 
 38. Id. at 647. 
 39. See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
 40. See generally Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9 (noting the ongoing problem of 
the criminalization of homelessness). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1569. 
 43. Id. at 1569-70. 
 44. Id. at 1583. 
 45. Id. (holding that the City’s practices constituted an unlawful search/seizure under 
the 4th Amendment). 
 46. Id. at 1564. 
 47. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 76 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 1996). 
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protect the rights of the homeless.48 As part of the settlement, the City 
agreed to conduct training for police officers, educating them on the plight 
of the homeless.49 The City also instituted mandatory procedures for law 
enforcement officers to follow when dealing with the homeless to ensure 
the protection of the homeless population’s legal rights.50 Finally, the City 
set up a $600,000 fund to compensate homeless citizens injured by the 
enforcement of the statutes.51 
In the 1993 case Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, plaintiffs 
challenged the City of San Francisco’s “Matrix” program, a strict 
enforcement of a group of ordinances prohibiting homeless activities.52 The 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California found 
that homelessness is not a status, and therefore rejected the plaintiffs’ claim 
that the program punished them for their status in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.53 The court also rejected the claims that the program violated 
the plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection, due process, and travel.54 On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the case was moot 
because, under a new mayor, the City had eliminated the Matrix program.55 
In Johnson v. Dallas, a 1994 case, the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Texas held a similar group of ordinances 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.56 The plaintiffs alleged that 
the ordinances violated their Eighth, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.57 The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary 
injunction in part, holding that the ordinances punished the status of 
homelessness, and as such, violated the Eighth Amendment.58 In dicta, 
however, the district court rejected the Equal Protection claims, finding that 
the homeless are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class and that the laws were 
                                                                                                                           
 48. Pottinger v. City of Miami–Negotiations Lead to Settlement Agreement, LAW 
LIBRARY–AMERICAN LAW AND LEGAL INFORMATION, available at 
http://law.jrank.org/pages/24461/Pottinger-v-City-Miami-Negotiations-Lead-Settlement-
Agreement.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2011). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Jones v. City and County of S.F., 846 F. Supp. 843, 845 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
 53. Id. at 853-58. 
 54. Id. at 858-61. 
 55. Joyce v. City and County of S.F., 87 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 56. Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 347-48 (N.D. Tex. 1994), rev’d in part, 
vacated in part 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 57. Id. at 351, 358. 
 58. Id. at 359. 
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rationally related to a legitimate state interest.59 On review, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed and declared the ordinances constitutional.60 The 
Fifth Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment applies only after conviction for a criminal offense, 
and the plaintiffs in this case had only been cited or fined, not convicted.61 
The case was eventually dismissed.62 
In 2006, in Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, a 
church had invited homeless individuals to sleep on its outdoor property.63 
The City of New York forced the homeless to move, despite the fact that 
they were sleeping on private property.64 The district court granted a 
preliminary injunction preventing the City’s actions regarding the church 
property, but denied the injunction as to the public sidewalk bordering the 
church’s property.65 On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the Church’s provision of 
sleeping space to the homeless was the manifestation of a sincerely held 
religious belief deserving of protection under the Free Exercise Clause.66 As 
such, the City’s actions were subjected to strict scrutiny.67 The Second 
Circuit also rejected the City’s argument that its actions were necessary to 
address a public nuisance, because no evident health risk had been proved.68 
Jones v. City of Los Angeles, a 2006 case, is the most recent significant 
decision regarding homelessness statutes.69 In Jones, six homeless 
individuals brought suit against Los Angeles, challenging arrests made for 
violating a statute that prohibited individuals to “sit, lie or sleep in or upon 
any street, sidewalk or other public way.”70 The Plaintiffs, relying on 
Pottinger v. City of Miami, argued that the ordinance violated the 
Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments of the United States Constitution.71 
                                                                                                                           
 59. Id. at 355-58. 
 60. Johnson v. City of Dallas, 61 F.3d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 61. Id. at 444-45. 
 62. Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9, at 101. 
 63. Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 572-73. 
 66. Id. at 575. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 576. 
 69. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 70. L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.18(d) (2011). 
 71. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1125. 
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The district court rejected the Plaintiffs’ reliance on Pottinger, holding that 
the plaintiffs were not a certified class, and granted summary judgment for 
the City of Los Angeles following the reasoning in Joyce v. City and 
County of San Francisco.72 The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, which held that the City of Los Angeles’s treatment of 
these individuals—arresting them for sleeping on the streets when there was 
no other viable option—constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the 
Eighth Amendment.73 In October of 2007, the City settled the lawsuit, 
agreeing not to enforce the law between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. until 1,250 
permanent housing units for the homeless were constructed.74 The 
settlement also required that, before any arrests were made for violating the 
ordinance, the police officers had to provide adequate verbal warning and a 
reasonable time to move.75 
III. CRIMINALIZING HOMELESSNESS: THE PROBLEM 
While many cities have criminalized the activities associated with 
homelessness in recent years, this Comment will focus on two cities that 
illustrate the greater national problem—Seattle, Washington and St. 
Petersburg, Florida. Other cities, such as Los Angeles, California,76 Atlanta, 
Georgia,77 and even Boise, Idaho,78 are implementing similar programs. 
                                                                                                                           
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 1137. 
 74. Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9, at 35. 
 75. Id. 
 76. A 2009 report named Los Angeles the “meanest” city in the United States with 
regard to the homeless. Id. at 33. In 2006, Los Angeles enacted the Safer City Initiative, a 
program designed to clean up the city. Id. at 34. Los Angeles spends $6 million a year to 
implement the Safer City Initiative, but budgets only $5.7 million a year for homeless 
services. Id. The Safer City Initiative added fifty police officers to patrol the Skid Row area. 
Id. These officers arrest homeless people for crimes like jaywalking and loitering, crimes 
that usually go unnoticed outside of Skid Row. Id. at 35. During one eleven-month period, 
twenty-four inhabitants of Skid Row were arrested on 201 different occasions, costing the 
city $3.6 million for jail time, prosecutors, public defenders, and other court expenses. Id. at 
34. While crime in Skid Row has dropped under the Safer City Initiative, the City has not 
come through on its promise to provide additional homeless services under the program, 
leaving many individuals without any options. Id. Since the implementation of the Initiative, 
homeless residents have moved to other areas that cannot supply needed services. Id. One 
study estimated that 1,345 people occupied the streets of Skid Row at the beginning of 2006. 
Id. One year later, that number had dwindled to 875. Id. While Skid Row’s homeless 
population dwindled, the homeless populations of surrounding areas dramatically increased. 
Id. While many applaud the Safer City Initiative as a wonderful scheme that has brought 
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A. Seattle, Washington 
Approximately 2,827 people are unsheltered on any given night in King 
County, where the city of Seattle, Washington is located.79 In November of 
2007, Seattle implemented a new policy aimed to remove homeless people 
from their camps throughout the city.80 Despite the fact that the shelters 
throughout the city were at capacity and there was nowhere else for these 
people to go, city officials ordered all makeshift shelters destroyed, forced 
the residents to move, and destroyed their belongings.81 “Sweeps,” during 
which the police force would come through and destroy the shelters and 
possessions, happened twice in 2007.82 Announcements were made before a 
sweep in November, but several camps were cleared out in the summer 
without any notice.83 In the cases where advance notice was given, signs 
were posted informing the homeless that they would need to leave the 
premises within forty-eight hours.84 Many of these signs also listed an 
outdated phone number.85 During the sweeps, after confiscating personal 
property, city crews were told to store personal items for up to sixty days 
and discard anything worth less than twenty-five dollars.86  
                                                                                                                           
hope back to Skid Row, it has merely moved the problems elsewhere, oftentimes 
dramatically harming the homeless in the process. Id. 
 77. In 2007, the City of Atlanta enacted an ordinance outlawing panhandling in heavily 
visited downtown areas and anywhere after dark. Id. at 38. “The ordinance also prohibits 
panhandling within 15 feet of an ATM, bus stop, taxi stand, pay phone, public toilet, or train 
station. . . .” Id. Police officers dressed as tourists to catch people “aggressively begging” in 
the prohibited areas. Id.  
 78. The Boise Police began using bike patrol officers to enforce a strict anti-camping 
ordinance in 2007. Id. at 50. Although the number of unsheltered individuals exceeds the 
available shelter space, the police have cited hundreds of homeless individuals for violations 
of the anti-camping ordinance and a similar disorderly conduct ordinance. Id. In one extreme 
instance, a homeless individual was charged with theft for allegedly attempting to charge a 
cell phone at a park picnic shelter. Id. Homeless individuals are often arrested for failing to 
appear in court for these violations and failure to pay the required fines. Id. Sentences of up 
to ninety days have been imposed for violations of the ordinance. Id. Each day in jail comes 
with a twenty-five dollar fine for costs. Id. 
 79. Id. at 81. 
 80. Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9, at 80. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9, at 80.  
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A new plan for addressing the homeless in Seattle was announced in 
April of 2008.87 According to the plan, twenty shelter beds would be added, 
and during the camp sweeps, homeless residents would be given three days’ 
notice to vacate the area.88 Just a month later, however, a homeless camp in 
Queen Anne Park was swept and twenty-one tons of materials were 
removed.89  
After the demolition of the homeless camp in Queen Anne Park, a group 
of homeless individuals in Seattle banded together to create a new tent 
city.90 They satirically christened their community “Nickelsville” after 
Mayor Greg Nickels, the man largely responsible for the new policies.91 
Nickelsville houses from fifty to one hundred people each night.92 The 
camp has been housed at several different sites, including churches and 
public property.93 Founded with the intention of providing a place where 
inhabitants would know they had a guaranteed place to stay, the community 
enforces strict rules regarding alcohol, drug use, and other behavior.94 
Shortly after Nickelsville’s founding, Mayor Nickels ordered an eviction of 
the tent city for “safety and health concerns.”95 At that time, twenty-five 
residents were arrested.96 Since then, Nickelsville has moved several 
times.97 The group of homeless individuals set up camp, the City raids the 
camp, and they move again.98 As recently as September 2009, Port of 
Seattle Police entered the tent city and evicted its inhabitants.99 Police 
handcuffed twenty-two homeless persons and arrested them for trespassing 
on city property. 100 The inhabitants of the tent city have even been evicted 
                                                                                                                           
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 81. 
 90. Patrick Oppman, Tent City Becomes Home in Tough Times, CNN (Apr. 13, 2009, 
12:09 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/LIVING/wayoflife/03/19/seattle.tent.city. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 9, at 81. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Oppman, supra note 90. 
 99. NICKELSVILLESEATTLE.ORG, http://www.nickelsvilleseattle.org (last visited Feb. 16, 
2010). 
 100. Id. 
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from private property such as a church parking lot.101 Nickelsville leaders 
continue to look for a permanent location.102 
Despite the City of Seattle’s promises to improve, conditions continue to 
worsen. Facing a $56 million operating budget deficit for 2010, the King 
County Council made cuts across the board.103 The funds allocated to 
address homelessness and homelessness prevention (including shelters, 
food banks, etc.) were cut from $471,687 for 2009 to $154,000 for 2010.104 
Shelters, counseling programs, food banks, and legal services provided for 
the poor were stripped of all funding.105 Homeless youth shelters were 
completely cut from the budget.106 These organizations will either have to 
cease operations or look to other sources for funding. 
B. St. Petersburg, Florida 
The National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty named St. 
Petersburg, Florida the second “meanest city” towards the homeless in the 
nation in 2009, second only to Los Angeles.107 According to surveys, there 
are 6,235 homeless individuals in Pinellas County, the area surrounding St. 
Petersburg.108 That figure represents a 20% increase in the Pinellas County 
homeless population since 2007.109 Approximately 2,232 of the 6,235 
individuals experiencing homelessness are unsheltered, an 82.7% increase 
from 2007.110  
On January 19, 2007, St. Petersburg police raided two homeless camps 
after giving residents a week’s notice to vacate the premises.111 During the 
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raid, police used box cutters to slash and destroy tents,112 earning St. 
Petersburg a new nickname: “a national poster child for cruelty against the 
homeless.”113 In December of 2007, Catholic Charities established a new 
tent city called “Pinellas Hope” in the outskirts of the city.114 Since that 
time, local government has taken on part of the burden of running the 
camp.115  
In early 2007, St. Petersburg passed six new ordinances that essentially 
criminalize homelessness.116 These ordinances prohibit panhandling,117 
sleeping on sidewalks or streets,118 sleeping near private property,119 lying 
on streets or sidewalks during the day,120 constructing any temporary 
shelter,121 and storing personal property in public places.122 Since the 
passage of these ordinances, police officers regularly conduct sweeps 
throughout the city with signs instructing the homeless that they have 
thirty-six hours to remove their belongings from public property.123 
Removing personal belongings to other public property does not satisfy the 
requirement.124 After thirty-six hours, the property is confiscated and taken 
to a storage facility where, after thirty days, it is destroyed.125  
The situation in St. Petersburg has escalated to the point where Bob 
Dillinger, the Pinellas-Pasco public defender, has refused to extend a 
contract with St. Petersburg and will no longer represent indigent people 
arrested for violating municipal ordinances.126 Dillinger’s refusal was in 
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response to excessive arrests of homeless people throughout the city.127 
According to Dillinger’s office, 676 of the 879 people arrested for violating 
these municipal ordinances were homeless individuals from the city of St. 
Petersburg.128  
The National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty has filed a 
lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida 
on behalf of several homeless individuals who have been cited or arrested 
for violating one or more of the ordinances prohibiting homeless conduct.129 
The first of the plaintiffs, Anthony Catron, was issued a trespass warning on 
August 23, 2006, which stated that Catron would be subject to arrest if he 
was found anywhere in a city park.130 This warning is in place 
permanently.131 On August 29, 2007, an officer issued another trespass 
warning to Catron—this time, it applied to all public property in St. 
Petersburg, and would be in effect for one year. Neither warning 
specifically stated the violation cited.132 These warnings apply “curb to 
curb,” so that several public sidewalks are included.133  
Charles Hargis, another plaintiff in the case, was also issued two trespass 
warnings and arrested for being present in a park when it was open to the 
general public.134 One of the warnings was to be in effect for two years. 
Hargis was also issued a “Notice to the Owner and All Persons Interested in 
Affected Property,” a notice which required Hargis to remove his personal 
belongings from public property.135 The ordinance prohibiting public 
storage of personal belongings specifically states, “moving the unlawfully 
stored items to another location on public property shall not be considered 
to be removing the item from public property . . .” making it impossible for 
Hargis to have his belongings with him in any public place.136 
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Another homeless plaintiff, Ferdinand Lupperger, was also issued a trespass 
warning prohibiting his presence in St. Petersburg public parks.137 A week 
later, Lupperger was arrested for being present in a public park, despite the 
fact that the park was open to the public at the time.138 The report does not 
state the underlying violation.139 The other plaintiffs in the case were cited 
for similar violations. 
IV. A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO BE HOMELESS 
This Comment seeks to demonstrate that laws criminalizing 
homelessness violate the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and should therefore be invalidated by the courts and 
repealed by the legislatures. 
A. The Constitutional Framework 
1. The Fourteenth Amendment 
Three important doctrines are found in the Fourteenth Amendment: Due 
Process, Privileges and Immunities, and Equal Protection.140 Working 
together, these concepts guarantee each individual procedural protection of 
his fundamental rights.141 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that 
before a State deprives a person of life, liberty, or property, the State must 
give that person notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.142 
Due process is meant to protect each citizen’s fundamental rights, which 
consist of any “fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in 
the very idea of free government and is the inalienable right of a citizen of 
such a government.”143 To determine whether a person has been deprived of 
due process, courts must answer two questions. First, the court needs to 
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determine the nature of the interest.144 The Supreme Court has held that to 
determine whether due process requirements apply, courts must look “not 
to the weight but to the nature of the interest at stake.”145 Second, after a 
court has determined that the nature of the interest requires due process, it 
then must determine the type of notice required.146 The Supreme Court has 
put forth three factors to determine the type of notice due in a given 
situation: the individual’s interest in retaining his property, the risk of error 
through the procedures used, and the government’s interest, including costs 
or burden of the additional process.147  
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment directs that 
“all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”148 However, the 
states still have the power to classify people groups as long as its action 
survives judicial scrutiny.149 The Court uses three standards to judge 
whether classifications are valid: minimal scrutiny, strict scrutiny, and 
intermediate scrutiny.150 Under the default minimal scrutiny standard 
(rational basis), which is the lowest level of review, “legislation is 
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the 
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”151 Legitimate state 
interests include exercises of enumerated police powers, through which the 
state acts to protect the public health, welfare, morals, and safety of its 
citizens.152 The strict scrutiny standard, which is the highest level of review, 
is applied when a statute involves a suspect classification or violates a 
group’s fundamental rights.153 Under that standard, the classification is 
presumed invalid and the state must prove it is valid.154 The state must 
prove that the classification promotes a compelling governmental interest, 
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and that the statute is narrowly tailored such that there are no less restrictive 
means available to achieve the desired end.155 The third standard, 
intermediate scrutiny is a middle standard that focuses on whether a 
particular government action is “substantially related to a legitimate 
government interest.”156 Intermediate scrutiny is most often applied to cases 
involving quasi-suspect classifications.157 
There are two ways to evaluate legislation under Equal Protection 
analysis: either looking at it on its face or looking at its underlying 
purpose.158 When evaluating a statute facially, courts consider the text of 
the statute itself.159 If the text of the law is facially discriminatory, it will be 
struck down as invalid.160 If the text of the law is neutral on its surface, an 
individual challenging its constitutionality must prove that the law was 
enacted with a discriminatory purpose in mind.161 Under this discriminatory 
purpose analysis, courts look to the function of the law in specific instances 
to determine if it has been applied with a discriminatory purpose.162 In 
Crawford v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court stated, “Under 
decisions of this Court, a law neutral on its face still may be 
unconstitutional if motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”163  
In Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, the Supreme Court held 
that the freedom to travel is a fundamental right secured by the Constitution 
through the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.164 
Freedom to travel from state to state and to enter or live in any state is a 
“virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us 
all.”165 In a 1969 case, Shapiro v. Thompson, the Supreme Court stated that 
the Court had “long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union 
and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all 
citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land 
uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or 
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restrict this movement.” 166 The Court held that any State action that 
attempted to restrict such movement was “constitutionally 
impermissible.”167 In Shapiro, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the 
government action inhibiting the right to travel.168 While the right to travel 
had traditionally been found implicit in the text of the Equal Protection 
Clause, in Saenz v. Roe the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause to explicitly protect the 
right to travel.169 Viewed as a whole, the case law regarding the right to 
travel indicates that, whether the right comes from the Equal Protection 
Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause, there is a fundamental right 
to travel which, when infringed upon, triggers strict scrutiny analysis.170 
2. The Fourth Amendment’s Right to Privacy  
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 
each individual the right to privacy in his person and personal property.171 
The Court has consistently held that the Fourth Amendment’s right to 
privacy is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause.172 The Supreme Court summed up the 
principle in Wolf v. Colorado: “The security of one’s privacy against 
arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the core of the Fourth 
Amendment—is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in ‘the 
concept of ordered liberty’ and as such enforceable against the States 
through the Due Process Clause.”173 
The Supreme Court has put forth a two-fold test to decide uncertainties 
regarding the right to privacy. First, an individual must have a subjective 
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expectation of privacy.174 Second, that expectation must be one that society 
is prepared to recognize as reasonable.175 When these two requirements are 
met, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the state from infringing upon a 
citizen’s right to privacy.176 This right to privacy does “not vanish when the 
search in question is transferred from the setting of a home, an office, or a 
hotel room . . . . Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will 
remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”177 An individual’s 
property has been “seized” when there is some meaningful interference 
with that individual’s possessory interests in the property.178  
Twenty-five years after the Supreme Court established this privacy test, 
the Eleventh Circuit applied this standard to homeless individuals in 
Pottinger v. City of Miami, holding that homeless individuals have the 
required legitimate expectation of privacy in their personal belongings.179  
B. Applying the Constitutional Framework 
1. Seattle, Washington 
The City of Seattle, in expelling citizens from tent cities and destroying 
their property, violated the homeless persons’ rights to due process. The 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that before a 
person is deprived of life, liberty, or property, he must be given notice of 
the case against him and opportunity to meet it.180 In determining whether 
government actions regarding homeless activity violate procedural rights, 
the Supreme Court’s two-question due process analysis should be applied.  
First, the nature of the interest must be determined.181 In Poe v. Ullman, 
Justice Harlan considered the scope of the rights guaranteed by the Due 
Process Clause: 
This “liberty” is not a series of isolated points pricked out in 
terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and 
religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational 
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continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all 
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, . . . 
and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive 
judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful 
scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.182  
In other words, Harlan was suggesting that fundamental rights are not 
simply a list of rights found in the text of the Constitution, but include more 
broadly other rights that are so naturally fundamental as to demand a 
heightened level of scrutiny. In the Seattle tent cities, the interest at stake is 
the right to privacy in personal property—a right to freedom from arbitrary 
impositions. While a right to privacy is often found implicit in the 
Constitution,183 even if it is not, it is one of those rights necessary to be free 
from “arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints”184 and is therefore 
fundamental.  
In conducting the camp sweeps, the police destroy not only the 
inhabitants’ temporary shelters, but also much of their personal property.185 
The Fourteenth Amendment specifically states that no person shall be 
deprived of property without due process of law.186 The Fourth Amendment 
deliberately guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects . . . .”187 The right to privacy in personal 
belongings is specifically addressed within the Constitution itself, and 
certainly qualifies as a principle “inherent in the fundamental idea of liberty 
itself.”188 The United States is a nation founded on personal property 
interests.189 Therefore, the homeless individuals’ privacy interest in their 
personal property is a fundamental right specifically protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. The seriousness of the loss of this property cannot be 
emphasized enough; these people have nowhere else to go or to store their 
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belongings.190 Because shelters are at capacity, their only option is to find 
refuge in tent cities.191  
Second, if it is determined that the nature of the interest requires due 
process, the type of required notice must be determined.192 To determine the 
type of notice required, the Supreme Court has prescribed three factors: the 
individual’s interest in retaining his property, the risk of error through the 
procedures used, and the costs or burden of the additional process.193 The 
inhabitants of the tent cities have a great interest in retaining their 
property—these possessions are all that they own. Also, there is a very high 
risk of error in the current procedure. Without any investigation into the 
reason for the violation or the availability of alternate storage, innocent 
individuals’ property may be destroyed. The City of Seattle, at times, has 
failed to provide notice to the homeless population of upcoming sweeps.194 
This type of notice would not be difficult to provide—it has already been 
provided in some circumstances.195 Were a court to apply this framework, 
considering these three factors together and balancing each party’s interests, 
it seems to be a logical conclusion that these sweeps and the destruction of 
personal property violate the fundamental right to due process. 
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court put forth a test to determine 
when an individual’s right to privacy is protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.196 Under Katz, so long as the Nickelsville inhabitants have a 
“reasonable” expectation of privacy in their personal belongings, these 
government sweeps violate the homeless individuals’ rights.197 When the 
Eleventh Circuit held that homeless individuals do have a legitimate, 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal belongings, the court 
was referring to homeless individuals on the street.198 The inhabitants of 
Nickelsville live in a fixed, semi-permanent location.199 They conduct all of 
their daily living activities in this place, and are part of a larger 
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community.200 Surely, if people on the street have a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in their personal belongings, these homeless individuals continue 
to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their personal belongings 
when those possessions are stored in a semi-permanent structure inside of a 
larger community. If the right to privacy in these items is determined to be 
valid, the city’s actions in confiscating personal property constitute a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unlawful seizures.  
The Supreme Court, in Payton v. New York, held that “[t]he seizure of 
property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively 
reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property 
with criminal activity.”201 This concept is related to the “open fields 
doctrine,” which holds that the special protection accorded by the Fourth 
Amendment to citizens in their persons, houses, papers, and effects does not 
extend to the open, public areas.202 Some may argue that, because these 
individuals are in public places, the open fields doctrine applies and their 
right to privacy no longer applies. The difference here is that these 
individuals, in most instances, are not suspected of any criminal activity 
other than being in the wrong place at the wrong time. In conducting the 
sweeps, Seattle police did not seize personal belongings as evidence of 
some greater crime; the homeless individuals’ possessions were seized 
simply because they were on public property. Furthermore, application of 
the open fields doctrine in this case conflicts with the very purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment as outlined in Katz: “[T]his effort to decide whether or 
not a given ‘area,’ viewed in the abstract, is ‘constitutionally protected’ 
deflects attention from the problem presented by this case. For the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.”203 The physical boundaries of the 
home are protected in order to prevent intrusion into the “privacies of the 
life within.”204 As Justice Harlan stated in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman:  
Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely 
from the sanctity of property rights. The home derives its pre-
eminence as the seat of family life. And the integrity of that life 
is something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its 
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protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted 
Constitutional right.205 
The right to privacy, universally considered fundamental, prevents the 
government from seizing personal property without just cause. 
Equal Protection guarantees that “all persons similarly circumstanced 
shall be treated alike.”206 In the case of Nickelsville, the Mayor developed a 
specific plan to address the homeless.207 This plan included police sweeps 
of homeless tent cities in order to demolish temporary structures and 
destroy individuals’ personal property.208 This law was put in place to affect 
the homeless and no one else. Therefore, it is discriminatory on its face. 
However, the states still have the power to classify people groups as long as 
the classification is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.209 
The City of Seattle asserts that the sweeps and ordinances are in place to 
preserve the health and welfare of the city.210 On its face, this is a legitimate 
government interest; the City of Seattle is exercising its enumerated police 
power in order to protect its citizens. However, the means implemented are 
not rationally related to the interest at hand—destroying a homeless 
individual’s personal property does not protect any citizen’s health or 
welfare, and only injures the homeless individual. Therefore, these sweeps 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Some would argue that these individuals’ personal property has no value 
and is in fact nothing more than an assortment of trash collected from the 
street. In some instances, these belongings may in fact be hazardous to 
public health. However, the Fourth Amendment does not protect an 
individual’s property from being seized so long as it has some objective 
value.211 In fact, the Amendment is deliberately broad: it protects “persons, 
houses, papers, and effects.”212  
As citizens of the United States, the homeless inhabitants of Nickelsville 
have a valid privacy interest in their personal belongings, despite the value 
or location of those belongings. When the government came in, without 
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notice, and decided to summarily seize and destroy everything these 
individuals owned, it violated these individuals’ constitutional rights of due 
process, privacy, and equal protection. 
2. St. Petersburg, Florida 
Because an analysis regarding the personal property issues would be the 
same in St. Petersburg as in Seattle, the analysis of St. Petersburg will focus 
on the trespass warnings issued to various homeless individuals. Trespass 
warnings prohibiting presence in any city park have been issued to several 
homeless individuals, often without notice of the underlying violation. 
Some of these warnings prohibit an individual from entering a city park for 
a year, while others prohibit any entrance indefinitely. 
To determine whether the trespass warnings violate the Due Process 
Clause, the Supreme Court’s two-question analysis should be utilized. First, 
the nature of the interest must be determined. Upon examination, it 
becomes apparent that the interest at stake here is very much a fundamental 
right. These individuals are being deprived of their right to freedom of 
movement and travel, a right implicitly found in the Constitution and 
generally considered to be fundamental.213 Whether the fundamental right 
to travel is found in the Equal Protection Clause or the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, it is indeed a fundamental right which, when infringed 
upon, subjects a government action to strict scrutiny.214  
Second, after the court finds that the nature of the interest requires due 
process, it must then determine the type of notice required.215 Three factors 
to determine the type of notice due are: the individual’s interest in retaining 
his right, the risk of error through the procedures used, and the costs or 
burden of the additional process.216 The state’s interest, the public health 
and welfare, does not exceed the homeless individual’s personal interest in 
being allowed to exist in public areas. The risk of error is great because 
homeless individuals who do not purposely violate any ordinance or do not, 
in fact, violate any law may be banned from public areas for indefinite 
periods of time. The St. Petersburg police provide notice to the homeless 
through the issuance of the warnings themselves. However, that notice is 
not sufficient. No hearings are scheduled, and many of the individuals 
issued citations do not understand the full import of the situation. Without 
any procedural protection of the right to exist in public places, the homeless 
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of St. Petersburg will continue to be pushed out of public areas and receive 
citations for violation of trespass warnings. Fines accompany every citation 
and these individuals cannot afford to pay and criminal records these people 
cannot afford to accumulate. The ordinances themselves perpetuate 
homelessness because by criminalizing activities these people must engage 
in to survive, the city is making it virtually impossible for the homeless to 
find work or permanent housing. Few employers are willing to hire those 
with long criminal records, and few landlords are willing to rent to those 
with unfortunate financial and criminal backgrounds. 
All citizens have the right to “travel throughout the length and breadth of 
our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably 
burden or restrict.”217 Yet these trespass warnings prohibit a class of 
individuals from traveling in public areas, even when these areas are open 
to the non-homeless public. Because the right to travel is fundamental, 
government actions affecting this right are subject to strict scrutiny 
review.218 The state must prove that the action promotes a compelling 
government interest, and that the statute is narrowly tailored such that there 
are no less restrictive means available to achieve the desired end.219 St. 
Petersburg’s alleged objective is protecting the public health and welfare. 
While the government has a legitimate interest in protecting the public 
health and welfare, that has not been considered a compelling government 
interest. The Court has not established a bright-line test for whether a 
government interest is compelling, but it usually involves some level of 
necessity.  
Even if St. Petersburg’s objective in issuing trespass warnings 
constituted a compelling government interest, there are certainly less 
restrictive ways of accomplishing the same goal. Prohibiting an individual 
from entering any public park or any public area for a year or longer is an 
extreme measure. Several of the plaintiffs in Catron were prohibited from 
entering any public area for a year or more.220 Therefore, prohibiting these 
homeless individuals’ entrance into any public area is a violation of their 
fundamental right to freedom of travel.  
Although the Equal Protection Clause guarantees that “all persons 
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike,” 221 the officers enforcing the 
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trespass warnings in St. Petersburg are targeting a specific class—the 
homeless. Because homelessness is not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, 
minimal scrutiny applies.222 Therefore, if St. Petersburg can prove that the 
practice of issuing trespass warnings to homeless individuals is rationally 
related to the legitimate government interest of protecting the public health 
and welfare, this practice would not violate the Equal Protection Clause, 
even though it appears to violate the fundamental right of homeless people 
to freedom of travel.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The history of homelessness and its criminalization is decidedly mixed. 
Throughout the last fifty years, some courts have held statutes criminalizing 
homelessness constitutional, while others have struck them down on a 
variety of grounds. While in some cases these laws are struck down as 
unconstitutional, the real problem lies in the way these cases almost always 
end. Many times, after a court hands down a decision unfavorable to a city 
and its actions concerning the homeless, a city will offer the homeless 
plaintiffs generous settlements in exchange for vacating the adverse 
judgment.223 For instance, the Eleventh Circuit decision Jones v. City of Los 
Angeles would have gone a long way toward shifting the tide regarding the 
criminalization of homelessness, but that decision was vacated after the 
parties reached a settlement.224 Pottinger v. Miami, another case which 
could have had even greater effects in this area of the law were it not 
settled, ended with an agreement in which the city implemented training for 
law enforcement and set up a $600,000 compensation fund for injured 
parties.225  
The problem of homelessness is one that affects virtually every city 
throughout the nation. Organizations like the National Law Center on 
Homelessness and Poverty, the National Coalition for the Homeless, and 
many others have been working with homeless individuals in an effort to 
end homelessness. Some cities have set up initiatives to provide housing for 
those in need: for instance, Portland, Oregon has implemented a program 
where city funding enables outreach agencies to offer permanent housing to 
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people while they work to find employment.226 Private organizations have 
also been able to reach out to the homeless in order to improve their plight. 
In St. Petersburg, a new initiative called “Project Homeless Connect” was 
launched on January 30, 2010.227 Through this project, about 1,200 
homeless individuals received medical care, job and housing assistance, 
legal services, and other personal services.228 As part of the initiative, 
Pinellas County held the state of Florida’s first “Homeless Court,” through 
which the county hopes to settle minor criminal cases with homeless 
defendants.229  
Things are slowly improving, but this issue will not be put to rest until these 
laws are completely eradicated. Instead of criminalizing homelessness and 
pushing those in the greatest need deeper into poverty, Americans need to 
band together and do something to address the homelessness pervading 
their cities. After all, in a country founded on the doctrines of equality and 
liberty that is the least we can do. 
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